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We examined this question, with a focus on the contrast between past harmful and past impure actions. Partic-
ipants' judgments reﬂected two independent inﬂuences: action consistency and expectation asymmetry. An ex-
pectation asymmetry was observed across seven studies, including two pilot studies and two supplemental
studies: impure agents were judged as more likely to be harmful than harmful agents were judged likely to be
impure. This expectation asymmetry is not due to an expectation that impure agents will be globally deviant,
i.e., likely to commit all kinds of violations (Study 1), nor is it due to differences in the perceived wrongness or
weirdness of harmful versus impure acts (Study 2). Study 3 demonstrated that this asymmetry is not attributable
to the perceivedharmfulness of impure actions; only impure agents, and not harmful agents, were expected to be
more harmful than they were previously. These ﬁndings highlight an important asymmetry in the way people
make predictions about futurewrongdoing: immoral agents are expected to behave consistently, and are also ex-
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In advocating the death penalty for homosexual acts, the psychologist
Paul Cameron noted that “those who act on their homosexual desires or
interests usually end up being parasites on society, and parasites that
are very dangerous for society, not only because they take far more than
they contribute to society, but they particularly injure children” (Gettys,
2014). This statement captures a tragically widespread sentiment that
gay men and women are likely to act in harmful ways. Similar charges
have been leveled at peoplewho engage in other forms of non-normative
sexual practices, such as zoophilia, despite evidence to the contrary (see
Beetz, 2002, 2004). What is the psychology behind inferences like this?
The present research investigates people's expectations about agents' fu-
ture transgressions, based on information about agents' past behaviors.1.1. The expected behaviors of others
A key function of social cognition is behavior prediction (Dennett,
1989; Saxe, 2012). A reasonable predictor of how people may behaveresearch reported in this paper.
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016/j.jesp.2016.08.001in the future is how they behaved in the past. People are expected to be-
have consistently over time (Kelley, 1967; Quoidbach, Gilbert, &Wilson,
2013). Thus, someone who has unjustly harmed others in the past may
be predicted to be similarly harmful in other contexts and also across
time. These inferences are not necessarily irrational. For example, the
odds that property offenders will be rearrested for the same kind of
crime are 2.7 times the odds that non-property offenders will be
arrested for a property offense (Langan & Levin, 2002). Such statistics
indicate that at least some offenders are likely to commit similar kinds
of crimes over time, thoughwe note there is a general tendency to over-
estimate the likelihood of reoffending within particular domains, and
this is true for both violent and sexual crimes (Cunliffe & Shepherd,
2007).
Do people's inferences follow this logic across all kinds of past ac-
tions? Prior work has distinguished between two broad types of moral
violations: harmful (e.g., theft, murder, abuse) versus impure (e.g., in-
cest, bestiality, eating dog meat) (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;
Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt,
1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Young & Saxe, 2011).When evalu-
ating harmful acts, peopleweigh circumstantial evidence before passing
judgment, includingwhether the actwas intentional andwhether there
was a good reason for the agent to perform the act (Cushman, 2008;
Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009). By contrast, judgments of impure
acts tend to be less affected by contextual factors, including themetric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
1 In all studies, we tested ancillary hypotheses building on earlier work of the authors
(e.g., Chakroff & Young, 2015; Russell & Piazza, 2015), regarding the emotional reactions
elicited by harmful versus impure agents, and inferences about the motives and character
of these agents. These measures were not the focus of the present paper and will be sum-
marized only brieﬂy here. Harmful acts tended to evoke anger, while impure acts (sexual
and substance) tended to evoke disgust. Harmful actors were perceived to be cruel, while
impure actors were perceived as perverse and motivated by sexual desires. Finally, harm-
ful acts weremore likely to be seen as having a victim and involving a lack of consent than
impure acts (please contact the authors for more information).
2 Participants reported their political orientation in all studies. In no analysis did social
conservatism signiﬁcantly predict participants' judgments of likelihood that agentswould
commit harmful or impure acts.
2 A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxintentions of the agent (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Chakroff et
al., 2015; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a; Young & Saxe, 2011) and the
reasons and external circumstances leading to the act (Piazza, Russell,
& Sousa, 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b, 2011c). While harmful
acts are often thought to be motivated by a combination of internal
and external forces, impure acts are more likely to be attributed to
causes internal to the agent rather than situational forces (Chakroff &
Young, 2015; Russell & Piazza, 2015).
1.2. Pilot research: the expected behaviors of harmful and impure agents
Given this prior work, we predicted that impure behaviors would be
more informative about an agent and the agent's likely future behavior,
compared to harmful acts. Simply learning that an agent has acted im-
purely in the past might raise expectations that the agent will act im-
purely in the future, e.g., someone who committed incest yesterday
may be likely to do so tomorrow. By contrast, learning that an agent
was harmful in the past may be less informative: the harmful act
could have been due to external circumstances and less indicative of
the agent's stable, underlying dispositions, e.g., someone who punched
a man yesterday may be unlikely to do so tomorrow. Two studies were
independently conducted in two different labs (PSR + JP; AC + LY) in-
vestigating the expected behaviors of agents who committed harmful
versus impure actions. As reported in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 (see Supple-
mental materials), both impure and harmful agents were largely ex-
pected to engage in future actions of a similar kind (though the
precise means varied across studies). However, in addition to this con-
sistency effect, we also observed an unanticipated ﬁnding, an expecta-
tion asymmetry: impure agents were expected to be harmful more
than harmful agents were expected to be impure. Indeed, in at least
one of the studies (Pilot Study 1), the impure agent was expected to
be harmful just as much as they were expected to be impure. Notably,
this expectation asymmetry (more harmful behavior anticipated from
impure agents than impure behavior anticipated from harmful agents)
was obtained when contrasting harmful acts with two different kinds
of impure acts: sexual deviance (e.g., incest; Pilot Study 1) and actions
involving contact with taboo substances (e.g., touching feces; Pilot
Study 2). Furthermore, this expectation asymmetry occurred despite
whatmight be predicted on the basis of a reverse or negative halo effect
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Thorndike, 1920)—namely, that both agents
should be expected to behave badly in all respects.
1.3. The present research
Why would impure agents be expected to behave in harmful ways?
One possibility is that, once someone has committed an impure act, ob-
servers regard the impure individual as globally corrupt and capable of
anything. By contrast, harmful agents may not engender the same kind
of attributions because harmful acts are generallymore common and eas-
ier to justify in terms of external causes or reactions to circumstances (see
earlier discussion). On this account, impure agents, but not harmful
agents, should be judged as likely to engage in all kinds of violations. We
refer to this account of the expectation asymmetry as the global deviance
account.
The aims of the present research are threefold. First, we sought to
replicate the ﬁndings from the pilot studies and garner further support
for the expectation asymmetry:more harmful behavior should be antic-
ipated from impure agents than impure behavior should be anticipated
from harmful agents (Studies 1–2 and S1–S2). Second, we tested
whether the expectation asymmetry could be explained by the global
deviance account (Studies 1 and S1). Third, we sought to determine
whether the expectation asymmetry can be explained at the level of ac-
tion perception or action expectation, that is, by observers' perceiving
initial impure actions as in fact harmful, or whether, as hypothesized,
observers simply expect impure actors to act in ways that are more
harmful than their initial impure act (Study 3).Please cite this article as: Chakroff, A., et al., From impure to harmful: Asym
cial Psychology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.0012. Study 1. Impure agents and global deviance
According to the global deviance account, impure agents should be
judged as highly likely to engage in all kinds of violations. A liberal test
of this account would be to test whether agents who committed one
kind of impure violation (e.g., sexually deviant acts, labelled “impure-sex-
ual violations” below) are also expected to commit other kinds of impure
violations (e.g., contact with impure substances, labelled “impure-sub-
stance violations” below). In Study 1, participants judged the likelihood
that an agent who had committed one of three kinds of violations (harm-
ful, impure-sexual, impure-substance) would engage in all three kinds of
violations. We sought to replicate the ﬁndings of Pilot Studies 1–2 using
new scenarios, while also testing the global deviance account of the ex-
pectation asymmetry. Our Pilot Study 1 reliably observed the expectation
asymmetry using n = 35; thus, our recruitment strategy throughout
aimed to recruit at least 35–50 participants per cell. Participants were
only excluded if they did not complete the entire study. Because Study
1 and Studies S1-S2 involved themost complex designs, these studies re-
quired the largest samples.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Four participants did not ﬁnish the survey and were excluded. We
recruited a sample of 255 adults located in the United States (139 fe-
male;Mage = 36.68 years, SD= 11.37) via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
2.1.2. Materials and procedures
In a 3 (agent type: harmful vs. impure-sexual vs. impure-substance)
× 3 (expected behavior: harmful vs. impure-sexual vs. impure-sub-
stance) mixed-measures design, participants were randomly assigned
to read about an agentwho intentionally performed a harmful violation
(e.g., assault), an impure-sexual violation (e.g., incest), or an impure-
substance violation (e.g., eating dogmeat) (see Appendix A for stimuli).
For each subdomain of impure acts there were two scenarios, and for
harmful acts there were four scenarios. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the eight scenarios. To standardize the agent and tar-
get of each action, the scenarios always involved two brothers, and par-
ticipants were asked to imagine that one of the brothers “willfully and
intentionally” engaged in the act. Participants then rated the likelihood
that the agent would commit the eight harmful violations (α= 0.95)
and eight impure-sexual violations (α= 0.93) used in Pilot Study 1,
and the eight impure-substance violations (α = 0.94) from Pilot
Study 2. Participants then rated thewrongness of the behavior and com-
pleted additional measures,1 including whether something internal or
external to the agent was the likely cause of the action (see Appendix
SE), and demographic questions2 before being debriefed and paid.
2.2. Results
For brevity, wrongness measures for all studies are reported in Table
S1, and internal vs. external attribution measures for Studies 1–2 are re-
ported in Table S2. Three separate within-subjects ANOVAs of likelihood
judgments are reported for each agent type: harmful, impure-sexual,metric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
3A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxand impure-substance. See Fig. 1 for likelihood means and standard
errors.
2.2.1. Harmful agents
The main effect of expected behavior was signiﬁcant, F(2, 132) =
107.52, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.62. Post-hoc tests revealed that harmful
agents were judged as more likely to commit harmful violations
(M = 5.18, SE = 0.17) than impure-sexual violations (M = 2.96,
SE = 0.14) or impure-substance violations (M = 2.91, SE = 0.15)
(ps b 0.001, Bonferroni corrected), but were equally likely to perform
the two kinds of impure violations (p N 0.99).
2.2.2. Impure-sexual agents
The main effect of expected behavior was signiﬁcant, F(2, 62) =
14.60, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.32. Post-hoc tests revealed that impure-sexual
agents were judged as equally likely to commit impure-sexual viola-
tions (M = 3.86, SE = 0.22) and harmful violations (M = 3.91, SE =
0.21) (p N 0.99), and were judged as more likely to commit harmful vi-
olations and impure-sexual violations than impure-substance violations
(M= 3.20, SE= 0.21) (ps b 0.001, Bonferroni corrected).
2.2.3. Impure-substance agents
The main effect of expected behavior was signiﬁcant, F(2, 55) =
30.34, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.53. Post-hoc tests revealed that impure-sub-
stance agents were judged as more likely to commit harmful violations
(M = 4.20, SE = 0.25) than impure-substance violations (M = 3.57,
SE= 0.24) (p= 0.004, Bonferroni corrected), and more likely to com-
mit harmful violations and impure-substance violations than impure-
sexual violations (M = 2.94, SE = 0.21) (ps b 0.001, Bonferroni
corrected).
2.2.4. Expectation asymmetry
In a replication of Pilot Study 1, impure-sexual agents were judged
more likely to commit harmful violations (M = 3.91, SE= 0.21) than
harmful agents were to commit impure-sexual violations (M = 2.96,
SE= 0.14), F(1, 196) = 14.33, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.07. Replicating Pilot
Study 2, impure-substance agents were judged more likely to commit
harmful violations (M= 4.20, SE= 0.25) than harmful agents were to
commit impure-substance violations (M = 2.91, SE = 0.15), F(1,
189)= 20.84, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.10. Notably, there were no differences
in the perceived likelihood that agents would commit non-harm, other-
domain violations: that a harmful agentwould commit an impure viola-
tion (either sexual or substance), that an impure-sexual agent would
commit an impure-substance violation, or that an impure-substance
agent would commit an impure-sexual violation, F(2, 252) = 0.59,
p= 0.56, η2p = 0.005. These judgments highlight a “baseline” of viola-
tion expectedness (M= 3.00, SD= 1.64), albeit one that does not de-
pend on agents' past behaviors (e.g., harmful vs. impure). Finally, this
exact pattern of results emerged in an independent replication studyFig. 1. Study 1 expected behavior means by agent type (harmful, impure-sexual, impure-
substance). Means with different letter subscripts differed at p b 0.01. Error bars ± 1 SE.
Please cite this article as: Chakroff, A., et al., From impure to harmful: Asym
cial Psychology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.001with higher power (N= 325) and a balanced design (see Study S1 in
Supplemental materials).
In sum, we replicated the expectation asymmetry observed in Pilot
Studies 1–2. Both kinds of impure agents were judged more likely to
be harmful than harmful agents were judged to be impure in either
subdomain. However, impure agents were not seen as likely to be glob-
ally deviant. Impure agents were judged no more likely than harmful
agents to act in a different subdomain of impurity. Put in terms of the
stimuli: The man who kissed his brother on the mouth is judged more
likely to start ﬁres than to eat worms.
3. Study 2. Ruling out weirdness and wrongness
Because impure violations may be judged as weirder ormore atypical
than harmful violations (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Gray & Keeney, 2015),
the expectation asymmetry may simply reﬂect participants' reasonable
assumptions that agents are more likely to perform less weird actions
(harmful actions) than more weird actions (impure actions). Insofar as
the impure acts used in Study 1may be judged asweirder than the harm-
ful acts, this difference may partially account for why impure agents are
expected to engage in both harmful and impure acts. If behavior expecta-
tions simply track judgments of behavior typicality, then controlling for
the weirdness of the harmful and impure actions (and hence the per-
ceived deviance of the agent) should eliminate the expectation
asymmetry.
Study 2was conducted with the aim of experimentally controlling for
the level of weirdness andwrongness in both sets of actions (original and
expected behaviors). To this end, we conducted a pre-study to obtain
harmful and sexual acts that were matched on both weirdness and
wrongness. For the pre-study we developed an inventory of 37 harmful
acts and37 impure-sexual acts, andpresented a randomsubset of roughly
half (n=18) the items to 224 undergraduate students recruited from the
University of Pennsylvania (78male;Mage=19.58 years, SD=1.43). Par-
ticipants rated the acts on a number of dimensions, including how
“wrong,” “harmful,” “weird,” “contaminating,” and disgusting (i.e., “How
nauseous/queasy/grossed out does this act make you feel?”) on 1–9
scales. Mean comparisons for these variables can be found in Appendix
B. As discussed above, if the perceived weirdness or moral wrongness of
the act is what drives the asymmetry, then experimentally controlling
for these factors should eliminate the asymmetry.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Six participants did not complete the entire study. We recruited a
new sample of 101 participants located in the United States (38 female,
Mage = 32.19, SD = 10.35) via Amazon Mechanical Turk; the recruit-
ment strategy was to obtain n= 50 per between-subjects cell.
3.1.2. Materials and procedures
Weused a 2 (agent type: harmful vs. impure-sexual) × 2 (expected be-
havior domain: harmful vs. impure-sexual) mixed-measures design. We
selected from our pre-study three harmful acts and three sexual acts
matched on weirdness and wrongness for our manipulation of agent
type. We also selected 16 violations that could be matched on weirdness
andwrongness to use as expected behaviors (see Appendix B for stimuli,
weirdness and wrongness means, and mean comparisons across do-
mains). Ratings from the pre-study conﬁrmed that the harmful acts se-
lected for expected behaviors were rated signiﬁcantly more harmful
than the selected impure acts (see Appendix B formeans andmean com-
parisons).While themean harmfulness ratings for the initial harmful acts
were higher than the initial impure acts, the difference did not quite
reach levels of signiﬁcance due to low power (the pre-study means are
based on item-level scores, rather thanparticipant-level scores, since par-
ticipants received only a subset of items).We also comparedwhether the
initial impure acts were seen as more harmful than the initial harmfulmetric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
4 A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxactswere seen as impure, using our pre-studymeasures of contamination
and disgust as indicators of impurity. The impure acts were rated equally
harmful (M=5.29, SE=0.50) as the harmful actswere rated as contam-
inating (M= 5.12, SE= 0.89), t(4) = 0.11, p= 0.92, and as disgusting
(M= 5.54, SE= 0.90), t(4) = 0.16, p= 0.88. This implies that any ob-
served expectation asymmetry cannot be explained by initial differences
in harmfulness and impurity.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six scenarios, and
as in previous studies theywere asked to imagine that the actor “willful-
ly and intentionally” engaged in the act. As in Study 1, the likelihood in-
dices were reliable: harmful (α= 0.94), impure-sexual (α= 0.94). In
the appraisal block, three items assessed wrongness using the same
items as Study 1 (α= 0.87). The order of the likelihood and appraisal
blocks was randomized.
3.2. Results
Therewas nodifference inwrongness by agent type, conﬁrming that
the scenarios were properly matched on wrongness for this study (see
Supplemental Materials). We then conducted a 2 (agent type) × 2 (ex-
pected behavior) mixed-model ANOVA on likelihood judgments.
Means and standard errors are reported in Fig. 2. Overall, agents were
seen as more likely to be harmful than impure, in a main effect of ex-
pected behavior domain, F(1, 99) = 13.52, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.12.
There was no main effect of agent type, F(1, 99) = 0.91, p = 0.34,
η2p=0.009. The interaction between agent type and expected behavior
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 99)= 26.36, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.21: harmful agents
were seen as more likely to be harmful than impure, but impure agents
were seen as equally likely to be harmful and impure. As in Study 1, we
found an expectation asymmetry: impure agents were judged as more
likely to be harmful than harmful agents were likely to be impure, F(1,
99) = 4.08, p= 0.046, η2p = 0.04.
In sum,when equating harmful and impure violations onwrongness
and weirdness, both in terms of the initial actions and expected behav-
iors, the expectation asymmetry still emerged, suggesting that partici-
pants are not simply judging agents who performed weird acts as
more likely to perform less weird acts than vice versa.
4. Study 3. Appraisals of the harmfulness of initial and expected acts
In the previous studies, participants judged impure agents as more
likely to perform harmful actions than harmful agents were to perform
impure actions. This expectation asymmetry was present even when
harmful and impure acts were equated on weirdness and wrongness
(Study 2). A possible complication, however, is that according to past re-
search impure acts can also be perceived as somewhat harmful (e.g., Gray,Fig. 2. Study 2 expected behavior means by agent type (harmful versus impure),
collapsing across levels of extremeness for both agent type and expected behavior.
Means with different letter subscripts differed at p b 0.05. Error bars ± 1 S.E.
Please cite this article as: Chakroff, A., et al., From impure to harmful: Asym
cial Psychology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.001Schein, &Ward, 2014). Thus, an alternative explanation may be that par-
ticipants perceived the impure acts as harmful, and these perceptions of
harm gave rise to expectations that impure (and therefore also harmful)
agents would be harmful—that is, a consistency effect for both impure
and harmful agents.We suggest that, while this interpretation is plausible
for the impure agents, it fails to explain the complete pattern of results for
harmful agents. If participants viewed impure acts as harmful, we would
expect them to judge the harmful agents as likely to engage in impure
(and therefore also harmful) acts, much like impure agents were expect-
ed to engage in harmful acts. But harmful agentswere not expected to en-
gage in impure acts to the same extent that impure agents were judged
likely to commit harmful acts, reﬂecting the asymmetry. Overall, the pat-
tern of results is more consistent with the idea that impure agents are ex-
pected to engage in harmful acts even when their initial actions are not
perceived to be especially harmful. If impure acts were simply seen as
harmful, there would be no asymmetry.
Here, we sought to obtain direct evidence that impure agents are ex-
pected to be harmful, as opposed to the alternative account that their
original impure acts were perceived as harmful. In other words, we
sought to show that the asymmetry emerges at the level of people's be-
havior expectations, rather than at the level of people's appraisals of im-
pure actions. To tease apart these two accounts, we had participants
directly appraise the harmfulness of all acts (original and expected), in
addition to judging the likelihood of agents committingharmful and im-
pure acts. Consistent with the view that participants expect impure
agents to behave harmfully, rather than the view that participants per-
ceive the original impure actions as harmful, we predicted that partici-
pants would expect impure agents to commit acts that were more
harmful than the initial acts they performed.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
We recruited a new sample of 197 participants located in the United
States (79 female, Mage = 33.19, SD= 10.67) via Amazon Mechanical
Turk.
4.1.2. Materials and procedures
We selected 10 harmful behaviors and 10 impure-sexual behaviors
previously used as either initial or expected behaviors in Study 2 (see
Appendix C). Participants were randomly assigned to view 1 of the 20
acts as an initial behavior intentionally committed by an agent named
John. Participants then rated the likelihood that the agent would inten-
tionally commit each of the 20 acts (i.e., expectation of behavior); all
items were presented in random order on a single page. Thus, in this
study, each item from the set of 20 acts was at some point treated as
the initial act, and appraisals were made over all 20 items, including the
initial act. This approach enabled us to directly comparemean differences
in appraisals of initial acts and expected behaviors. Participants indicated
whether the actor was likely to engage in the expected behavior by
selecting one of three options: 0 (“Not at all likely”), 1 (“Somewhat like-
ly”), and 2 (“Very likely”). We focused our analysis on behaviors partici-
pants thought the actor was at least “Somewhat likely” to perform in
the future. Note that we included three options to allow for gradation in
participants' “Likely” responses, yet the aim for analysis was to collapse
together acts that were rated as either somewhat or very likely.
On the next page, participants judged “How harmful” each of the 20
acts was, using Likert scales ranging from 1 (“Not at all Harmful”) to 7
(“Extremely Harmful”). Subsequent pages contained measures of dis-
gust, weirdness, and then moral wrongness, presented with the same
design as the harmfulness measure. We included a measure of disgust
as a proxy measure for impure actions. We included this measure
with the aim of showing that, consistent with the expectation asymme-
try, harmful agents are not expected to engage in more disgusting ac-
tions than performed previously, whereas impure agents are expected
to engage in more harmful actions than performed previously. Nometric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
Table 1
Appraisal and judgment means, standard errors, and statistics for Study 3.
Measure Expected behaviors F η2p
Harmful Impure
Harmful 5.07 (0.07) 4.17 (0.11) 107.74⁎ 0.36
Disgusting 4.24 (0.10) 5.25 (0.08) 156.26⁎ 0.45
Weird 4.78 (0.09) 5.57 (0.07) 131.41⁎ 0.40
Wrong 5.08 (0.08) 5.18 (0.09) 2.25ns 0.01
⁎ p b 0.001.
ns p N 0.05.
5A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxother measures were collected, aside from basic demographic informa-
tion (e.g., age, gender, political orientation).
4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Likelihood of harmful and impure acts
Distributions of likelihood judgments (i.e., not at all to very likely) by
initial action and expected action domain are displayed in Fig. 3. For
analysis, we compared the mean number of expected (i.e., “likely”)
acts across domains. We used a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney)
as the mean range was restricted from 0 to 10. In a conceptual replica-
tion of Studies 1–2 (and Studies S1–S2), we found an expectation asym-
metry: participants expected impure agents to perform more harmful
acts (M=4.20, SE=0.37), than the number of impure acts they expect-
ed harmful agents to perform (M= 3.34, SE= 0.34) (U= 3930.0, p=
0.045) – in Fig. 3, the contrast of H→ I and I→ H.
4.2.2. Appraisals
We conducted separate 2 (agent type) × 2 (expected behavior) mixed-
model ANOVAs on appraisals of harmfulness, disgust, weirdness, and
wrongness. We found no signiﬁcant main effects of, or interactions
with, agent type (all ps N 0.14), and thus report only means from the
main effects of expected behavior in Table 1. In brief, participants judged
harmful behaviors as more harmful than impure behaviors, impure be-
haviors as more disgusting and weirder than harmful behaviors, and
harmful and impure behaviors as similarlywrong. Thus,while the impure
andharmful actswere judged equallywrong, harmful actswere rated sig-
niﬁcantlymore harmful than the impure acts. This pattern of results is in-
consistent with the perceived harm account. Focusing on the initial acts,
as in Study 2, we examined whether impure acts were seen as more
harmful than harmful acts were seen as impure, using disgust as an indi-
cator of impurity. Quite the opposite, harmful acts were judged as slightly
more disgusting (M=4.27, SE=2.16) than impure acts were judged as
harmful (M=3.63, SE=2.20), t(195)=2.20, p=0.045, a result that no-
tably goes in the opposite direction of the observed expectation asymme-
try, and thus, if anything, works against our hypothesis.
4.2.3. Comparing initial and expected acts
Fig. 4 depicts difference scores for expected – initial acts, separately
for four DVs (harmful, disgusting,weird, wrong), and two types of initial
acts (harmful vs. impure). Full statistics for each comparison are report-
ed in Table 2. In general, aggregating across DVs, agents were expectedFig. 3. Distributions of likelihood judgments for each kind of initial action and expected
behavior (Harmful versus Impure) for Study 3. For example, column H → I reﬂects the
average number of impure acts, out of 10, that harmful agents are expected to perform:
Not at all likely (black), somewhat likely (darker gray), or very likely (lighter gray).
Participants expected impure agents to perform more harmful acts (I → H) than they
expected harmful agents to perform impure acts (H→ I).
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and wrong) than their initial acts, F(1184) = 8.400, p = 0.004, η2p =
0.04.
However, there was one exception to this general pattern. As can be
seen in Fig. 4, under column I→H (i.e., contrasts of Impure initial actions
with expected Harmful actions), agents who originally committed im-
pure acts were expected to engage in harmful actions rated as signiﬁ-
cantly more harmful than the original acts they performed. This was
the only comparison that was signiﬁcantly positive (M = 0.52, SE =
0.21), t(69)=2.26, p=0.027, indicating that, against the trend, impure
agents were expected to perform acts that were signiﬁcantly more
harmful than their initial act. In contrast, see column H → I. Harmful
agents were expected to engage in harmful acts that were less harmful
than their initial act (M = −0.35, SE = 0.15), t(106) = −2.39, p =
0.019. Also, harmful agents were not expected to engage in impure
acts that were more disgusting than their initial harmful act
(M = −0.07, SE = 0.24, t(84) = 0.28.39, p = 0.78). This point is
worth emphasizing. The impure acts that harmful agentswere expected
to perform were judged as no more disgusting than the initial harmful
act. In contrast, the harmful acts that impure agents were expected to
perform were signiﬁcantly more harmful than the initial impure act.
These results reveal that impure agents are expected to be more
harmful than they were previously, as explicitly indicated by the partic-
ipants. Furthermore, this inference goes against the grain of all other in-
ferences. Harmful agents are not expected to bemore harmful than they
were previously, and no agent is expected to bemore disgusting, weird,
or wrongful than they were previously. Thus, this study isolates expec-
tations of harmfulness as themain driver of the expectation asymmetry.
Furthermore, these results support our claim that the expectation asym-
metry results from an expectation that impure agents will be
harmful—indeed more harmful than past behavior might suggest.5. General discussion
Across seven studies (including two pilot studies, one direct replica-
tion [S1], and another study that examined self- vs. other-directed acts
[S2]), we found an asymmetry in participants' expectations of immoral
agents' behavior: impure agents were judged more likely to be harmful
than harmful agents were expected to be impure. Interestingly, impure
agents were not seen as globally deviant, i.e., likely to engage in all kinds
of immoral behavior (see Study 1 and its replication Study S1). Although
slight variations emerged across studies, we found broad evidence for a
consistency effect—impure agents (and harmful agents) were expected
to behave in a manner similar to their prior behavior (e.g., impure-
sexual➔ impure-sexual). However, impure agents were not expected
to be impure in a qualitatively different manner (e.g., impure-
sexual ➔ impure-substance). This ﬁnding was replicated in Study S1.
Furthermore, the expectation asymmetry was not accounted for by dif-
ferences in the perceived wrongness, harmfulness, or weirdness of the
harmful versus impure acts (Studies 2–3). The asymmetry emerged
when the initial harmful and impure actswere experimentallymatched
onwrongness andweirdness (Study 2) andwhen the impure acts were
appraised as much less harmful than the harmful acts (Study 3).metric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
Fig. 4. Appraisal measures for initial acts versus expected acts for Study 3, zeroed to the magnitude of the initial act. Harmfulness plotted in solid black; Disgust plotted in dotted black;
Weirdness plotted in solid gray; Wrongness plotted in dotted gray. Column labels (e.g., H→ I) indicate the kind of act initially performed, and following the→, the kind of act that was
expected (H = Harmful, I = Impure). The positive sloped solid black line compares the harmfulness of initial impure acts to the harmfulness of impure agents' expected harmful acts,
the only comparison which revealed greater magnitude for expected N initial appraisals.
6 A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxWhat can account for the expectation asymmetry? In particular,
why are impure agents expected to be harmful? One possibility is that
people perceive impure acts as causing harm in addition to being im-
pure (see Gray & Keeney, 2015; Gray et al., 2014). While there are cer-
tainly instances in which people perceive impure actions as causing
harm, this explanation does not account for the full pattern of the pres-
ent results. First, if participants saw impure acts as harmful, they should
have also judged harmful agents as likely to engage in harmful and im-
pure acts at similarly high levels, particularly when all acts were
matched for weirdness and wrongness. However, we observed the ex-
pectation asymmetry even when the weirdness and wrongness of the
harmful and impure acts were equated experimentally (Study 2). Per-
haps more importantly, in Study 3, the asymmetry persisted despite
clear differences in the perceived harmfulness of the harmful and im-
pure actions.Table 2
Appraisals and judgments difference scores for expected acts N initial acts for Study 3, re-
ported separately for harmful versus impure initial acts, and harmful versus impure ex-
pected acts.
Label Initial Expected DV Expected N initial t p
H→ H Harmful Harmful Harmful −0.35 −2.39 0.019
Disgusting −0.86 −4.87 b0.001
Weird −0.90 −4.96 b0.001
Wrong −0.36 −1.84 0.069
H→ I Harmful Impure Harmful −1.40 −6.45 b0.001
Disgusting 0.07 0.28 0.781
Weird −0.14 −0.59 0.559
Wrong −0.44 −1.77 0.080
I→ H Impure Harmful Harmful 0.52 2.26 0.027
Disgusting −1.29 −5.31 b0.001
Weird −1.15 −4.91 b0.001
Wrong −0.46 −1.85 0.068
I→ I Impure Impure Harmful −0.40 −1.76 0.083
Disgusting −0.46 −2.07 0.042
Weird −0.64 −2.70 0.009
Wrong −0.66 −2.83 0.006
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for impure versus harmful acts may contribute to the expectancy asym-
metry. As mentioned in the Introduction, past research has shown that
harmful acts are generally thought to stem from both internal and exter-
nal causes, while impure acts are thought to be largely internally generat-
ed (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Russell & Piazza, 2015). Indeed, in Studies 1–
2 (see Table S2 in Supplementalmaterials),we found that the impure acts
(especially sexually impure acts) were largely attributed to internal
causes, whereas harmful acts were attributed either more to external
than internal causes, or equally to each. Thus, insofar as impure acts
draw attention to the relative contribution of internal causes, this focus
on internal causes may increase the expectation that the impure agent
will behave immorally in other respects. However, in Study 1 and its rep-
lication (see Supplemental materials), we found that impure agents were
not expected to behave immorally in all respects, only in similarly impure
and harmful ways. Thus, differences in causal attributions do not help ex-
plainwhy harmful actions are given priority over other kinds of other-do-
main actions when people estimate the likelihood of immoral behaviors.
Another plausible account is that people conceptually equate
wrongdoing with harming others (Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray, Young,
& Waytz, 2012; Gray et al., 2014). Thus, insofar as impure agents are
conceptualized as wrongdoers, as they were in many of our studies
(Studies 2–3 used impure and harmful actions matched on measures
of wrongdoing), then observers may use a harm-based conceptual
framework as the basis for forecastinghowagentsmay behave in the fu-
ture. Because conceptualizations of wrongdoing and harm are closely
tied together, at least more so than wrongdoing and impurity (see
Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray et al., 2014), then intuitions of harm may
be accessible for use when judging the likely behavior of impure agents.
The inverse howevermay not be the casewhen predicting the behavior
of harmful agents. We believe this explanation deserves further empir-
ical scrutiny (see also Supplemental Study S2 for additional support).
Future studies should continue to probe the likely complex factors
that contribute to this expectation asymmetry. Indeed, in Study 3 we
found that people expected impure agents to act in ways that were
more harmful, but also less wrong (see Fig. 4, I → H). Thus, in at leastmetric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
7A. Chakroff et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2016) xxx–xxxone of our studies, expectations about harmfulness and wrongdoing
were clearly dissociated, contrary to what a harm-centric view of
wrongdoing would predict.
5.1. Theoretical implications and limitations
Our studies have important implications for current debates sur-
rounding how people think about impure actions and the reasons why
impure actors are often treated harshly. One account that we tested is
that people cannot help but perceive impure actions as harmful, much
like people cannot help but see the absent triangle within the Kanisza tri-
angle perceptual illusion (see Gray et al., 2014). However, in Study 3 we
used impure actions that were explicitly appraised by our participants
as less harmful than the harmful actions, yet matched onwrongness. De-
spite these differences in perceived harm, the expectation asymmetry still
emerged. People still expected impure agents to perform acts that were
more harmful than their initial acts – a pattern not seen for judgments
of harmful agents whowere expected to engage in somewhat less harm-
ful actions. Thus, people do not need to think that impure agents (e.g.,
zoophiles) are actually causing harm to anticipate that they will engage
in harmful practices (e.g., torturing animals) in the future. It is sufﬁcient
to simply appraise the actor as engaging in impure forms of wrongdoing
for expectations of harmfulness to emerge. This ﬁnding is important be-
cause it suggests that addressing the perceived harmfulness of impure ac-
tions may not be an adequate intervention to deterring expectations of
future harmfulness. Rather,whatmayneed to be redressed is the constru-
al of the impure action as a form wrongdoing.
Nonetheless, our studies had a number of limitations that should be
addressed in future research. First, in our test of the global deviance hy-
pothesis (Study 1), we relied on two sub-domains of impurity. Future
research could test the scope of this account by examining other kinds
of violations, such as acts of disobedience or disloyalty towards one's
group (e.g., washing a toilet with the national ﬂag) which, like impure
acts, are not overtly harmful yet are condemned by many (Graham et
al., 2009; Gray & Schein, 2012; Wright & Baril, 2011). If disobedient
and disloyal agents are also expected to be harmful, but not immoral
in other respects (e.g., impure), this would provide further evidence
for the account that harmful acts dominate people's expectations of im-
moral actors (Gray& Schein, 2012; Gray et al., 2014). Second,we did not
explicitly specify whether recipients of sexual-impure acts gave his or
her consent. Since consensual sexual acts are often seen as permissible
(Russell & Piazza, 2015), future work should examine whether agents
who commit impure acts with the consent of the recipient are just as
likely to be judged as harmful as those who act without consent.
Finally, future studies should examine whether this expectation
asymmetry is limited to transgressive actions or may apply in an analo-
gous way to non-transgressive actions. For example, in the domain of
recreational activities, we might examine expectations about a person
who has tried bungee jumping for the ﬁrst time. Do people expect this
person to next attempt another non-traditional sport, like hang gliding
orwater polo, or judge themmore likely to perform amore prototypical
sport like tennis or swimming? Such a study would help elucidate the
underlying conceptual processes operating within the expectation
asymmetry by determining whether a similar asymmetry may occur
outside of the scope of morality.
5.2. Conclusion
The present work has revealed a robust asymmetry, within the
moral domain, in people's expectations about immoral agents: harmful
agents are judged as likely to behave in similarly harmful ways, while
impure agents are judged as likely to behave in both impure and harm-
ful ways. This asymmetry is a tragic quirk of our minds, one that may
underlie the reactive and punitive measures taken against individuals
whose behaviors are largely harmless but are nonetheless perceived
to defy normative standards of propriety. Our ﬁndings highlight thePlease cite this article as: Chakroff, A., et al., From impure to harmful: Asym
cial Psychology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.001need for increased public awareness of the natural tendency to stigma-
tize individuals as dangerous, for example, when individuals have en-
gaged in harmless, but to the minds of some, unacceptable actions.
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John cuts his brother with a sharp knife.
John pours a cup of painfully hot water on his brother's lap.
John slaps his brother's face.
John hangs his brother by a rope for a few seconds then releases him.
Impure-sexual
John kisses his brother on the mouth.
John strokes his brother's bare inner thigh.
Impure-substance
John buys dog meat from a foreign grocery store and serves it to his
brother.
John orders stir-fried rat for his brother at a small restaurant in a city
in the USA.





Tell lies to get ahead in his career
Get into ﬁst ﬁghts
Drive under the inﬂuence of drugs or alcohol
Steal from a corporate organization
Cheat on an exam
Impure-sexual
Have sex with an elderly man/woman
Have sex with a dead animal, such as a dog or deer
Have an incestuous sexual relationship
Masturbate in public
Expose himself in public
Have sex with a corpse
Have sex with someone of the same gender+
Have sex with roast meat such as chicken or pork tenderloin
+While this itemmay not be construed bymany individuals as an im-
pure action, empirically this item factor loaded with the other impure-
sexual items (e.g., at 0.644 for Pilot Study 1), and thus was retained.
Impure-substance
Eat a worm
Pick up a used band-aid
Drink cow blood
Taste his own earwax
Step in vomit barefoot
Pick up dog poop barehanded
Pour urine on himself
Lick someone's shoemetric expectations about immoral agents, Journal of Experimental So-
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Study 2 initial acts
Harmful (Mwrong=6.95;Mweird=7.61;Mharmful=7.65;Mdisgusting=5.55;
Mcontaminating = 5.12).
Mark cuts off his friend's nipple.
Mark sticks the tip of a pencil in his friend's ear while he sleeps.
Mark hits his friend over the head with a textbook.
Impure-sexual (Mwrong = 6.92; Mweird = 7.84; Mharmful = 5.28;
Mdisgusting = 7.06; Mcontaminating = 5.49).
Mark sticks his penis in his dead girlfriend's body.
Mark sucks on his sister's ﬁngers one at a time.
Mark kisses his sister on the mouth.
Mean comparisons
Wrongness: 6.95 (SD= 1.07)–6.92 (SD= 1.44), t(4) = 0.024, p=
0.982; Weirdness: 7.61 (SD= 1.10)–7.84 (SD= 1.14), t(4) =−0.25,
p = 0.817; Harmfulness: 7.65 (SD = 0.95)–5.28 (SD = 1.74), t(4) =
2.06, p = 0.108; Disgusting: 5.55 (SD = 2.21)–7.06 (SD = 1.60),
t(4) = −0.96, p = 0.39; Contaminating: 5.12 (SD = 2.20)–5.49
(SD= 2.37), t(4) =−0.20, p= 0.85.
Study 2 expected behaviors
Harmful (Mwrong=6.28;Mweird=6.28;Mharmful=6.88;Mdisgusting=5.37;
Mcontaminating = 4.14).
Wring his sister's arm until it gives her an “Indian brush burn.”
Elbow his friend in the stomach.
Spank his brother on his bottom.
Pierce his partner's belly button with a needle.
Superglue pennies and other small objects to a stray cat.
Pierce the webbed feet of his pet frog with earrings.
Smash a lizard with a hammer.
Choke his girlfriend for a few seconds then release her.
Impure-sexual (Mwrong = 5.86; Mweird = 6.36; Mharmful = 4.73;
Mdisgusting = 5.93; Mcontaminating = 4.46).
Caress the genitals of a transgender friend.
Grope his friend's bottom.
Have sex with his girlfriend in a public bathroom stall.
Have anal sex with his romantic partner who had gender reassign-
ment surgery.
Fondle a goat's genitals.
Tickle his son's genitals with a feather.
Stroke his mother's inner thigh.
Let his stepbrother fondle his genitals.
Mean comparisons
Wrongness: 6.28 (SD=1.48) – 5.86 (SD=1.84), t(14) = 0.50, p=
0.621; Weirdness: 6.48 (SD= 1.66) – 6.36 (SD= 1.88), t(14) = 0.14,
p = 0.895; Harmfulness: 6.88 (SD = 0.90) – 4.73 (SD = 1.25),
t(14) = 3.92, p = 0.002. Disgusting: 5.37 (SD = 1.52) – 5.93 (SD =
1.60), t(14) = −0.71, p = 0.49; Contaminating: 4.14 (SD = 1.50) –
4.46 (SD= 1.12), t(4) =−0.47, p= 0.64.
Appendix C
Study 3 acts
When presented as an initial act, each item followed the agent's
name “John,” for example, “John elbowed his friend in the stomach.”
When presented as a expected act, the act was phrased in present
tense and presented without an agent, for example, “Elbow his friend
in the stomach”.Please cite this article as: Chakroff, A., et al., From impure to harmful: Asym
cial Psychology (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.001Harmful
John wrung his sister's arm until it gave her an “Indian brush burn.”
John elbowed his friend in the stomach.
John spanked his brother on his bottom.
John pierced his partner's belly button with a needle.
John superglued pennies and other small objects to a stray cat.
John pierced the webbed feet of his pet frog with earrings.
John choked his girlfriend for a few seconds then release her.
John cut off his friend's nipple.
John stuck the tip of a pencil in his friend's ear while he sleeps.
John hit his friend over the head with a textbook.
Impure-sexual
John caressed the genitals of a transgender friend.
John groped his friend's bottom.
John had sex with his girlfriend in a public bathroom stall.
John had anal sex with his romantic partner who had gender reas-
signment surgery.
John fondled a goat's genitals.
John tickled his son's genitals with a feather.
John stroked his mother's inner thigh.
John stick his penis in his dead girlfriend's body.
John sucked on his sister's ﬁngers one at a time.
John kissed his sister on the mouth.
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.001.
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